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I. INTRODUCTION
The use of ombudsmen to settle corporate disputes is on the rise, with
increasing numbers of corporations realizing the benefits of this alternative
dispute resolution method. 1 Few courts have considered the issue of
whether a privilege exists for communications made to corporate
ombudsmen. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the only federal
appellate court to have considered the issue, held in Carman that a blanket
privilege for corporate ombudsmen does not exist.2 How this decision will
affect the recognition of the privilege in other federal circuits is uncertain.
In addition, some fear that the lack of privilege may reduce the role of
ombudsmen in resolving corporate disputes, due to the fear that
confidentiality of communications made to ombudsmen cannot be
guaranteed. 3
IX. THE ROLE OF OMBUDSMEN IN RESOLVING CORPORATE DISPUTES
A corporate ombudsman is employed by a corporation to assist other
employees in resolving workplace disputes. 4 The ombudsman is a neutral
party who ordinarily is a member of the upper management staff and
reports directly to the chief executive officer or to other top management
* 114 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 1997).
1 As of 1986, nearly 200 ombudsmen were employed by corporations in the United
States, and by 1992, more than 1000 corporate ombudsmen were practicing. See Brenda
V. Thompson, Corporate Ombudsmen and Privileged Communications: Should
Employee Communications to Corporate Ombudsmen Be Entitled to Privilege?, 61 U.
C. L. REv. 653, 656 (1992-1993).
2 See Carman, 114 F.3d at 794-795.
3 See Kevin L. Wibbenmeyer, Privileged Communication Extended to the
Corporate Ombudsman-Employee Relationship Via Federal Rule of Evidence 501, 1991
J. Disp. RESOL. 367, 379: "The ombudsman-employee relationship rests squarely on the
employee's belief that information divulged to the ombudsman will remain confidential.
Destroying the employee's confidence in that confidentiality will likely result in
destroying the ombudsman program itself."
4 See Thompson, supra note 1, at 653 (citing Lee P. Robbins & William B. Deane,
The Corporate Ombuds: A New Approach to Conflict Management, 2 NEGOTIATION J.
195, 197 (1986)).
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staff.5 The role of corporate ombudsmen may vary. Their duties usually
involve "responsive listening," investigation, upward feedback to
management, direct resolution of controversies, advocacy, mediation and
arbitration. 6 Titles may vary as well as the levels of authority granted to
ombudsmen. 7 The typical ombudsman may handle 200-300 cases per year,
many of which involve employment concerns including salaries,
termination, sexual harassment and discrimination.8
One benefit of the ombudsman's role is the avoidance of litigation. 9 To
achieve this, the ombudsman must be neutral in dealing with all parties. 10
Also, the ombudsman relies on the confidential nature of her office to
encourage employees to come forward and air disputes." When disputes
cannot be resolved at this level, however, the issue of the ombudsman
privilege arises.
Ill. PRIOR CASES THAT HAVE ADDRESSED THE CORPORATE
OMBUDSMAN PRIVILEGE
A. Roy v. United Techs. Corp.12
In Roy, a former employee filed suit alleging race and age
discrimination under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act. 13 The plaintiff sought to depose the corporate ombudsman and also
served a request to produce the ombudsman's documents, and the
corporation fied a motion for a protective order. 14 The court granted the
5 See id. at 656.
6 See id. (citing Robbins & Dean, supra note 4, at 198-199).
7 See id. at 657 (citing William H. Gregory, Industry Grapples with Challenges
Posed by Contract Compliance, AVIAnON WEEK & SPACE TECH., Feb. 2, 1987, 84, 85;
Robbins & Dean, supra note 4, at 201).
8 See id. at 657 (citing Mary P. Rowe, The Corporate Ombudsman: An Overview
and Analysis, 3 NEGOTIATION J. 127, 135 (1987)).
9 See id. at 653.
10 See id.
11 See id. at 654.
12 Civil Cause No. H89-680 (JAC) (D. Conn. 1990), unreported, discussed in
Thompson, supra note 1, at 660-661.
13 See Thompson, supra note 1, at 660-661.
14 See id.
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protective order, recognizing an ombudsman privilege limited to the facts
of the case. 15
The court considered four factors in its determination: "(1) whether the
parties believed that the communications were confidential, (2) the need for
confidentiality, (3) whether society would recognize the value of the
confidential relationship, and (4) a comparison of the benefits of disclosure
to the injury that might result." 16 The court concluded that the need for
confidentiality outweighed the plaintiffs need to obtain the information in
that manner. 17
B. Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.18
In this case, the first reported case to come to trial on the issue of the
existence of an evidentiary privilege for corporate ombudsmen, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted a motion
to protect from discovery the communications made to a corporate
ombudsman. 19 The plaintiff had filed a sex discrimination suit and sought
to depose the ombudsman, whom the plaintiff had consulted after learning
that the company planned to terminate her employment. 20 In response, the
ombudsman sought a protective order under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(c)(1). 21
15 See id.
16 Id. at 661.
17 See id.
18 133 F.R.D. 570 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
19 See id. at 571.
20 See Id.
21 See id. The rule states as follows:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought,
accompanied by a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or
attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute
without court action, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is
pending, or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the
district where the deposition is to be taken may make an order which justice
requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression,
or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: (1) that the
disclosure or discovery not be had.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).
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The court evaluated the same four factors applied in the Roy decision,
emphasizing that confidentiality is essential to maintaining the neutrality of
the ombudsman's office. 22 The court argued that confidentiality is essential
to ombudsman-employee relationships because the function of that
relationship is to "receive communications and to remedy workplace
problems, in a strictly confidential atmosphere." 23 Furthermore, without
such confidentiality, "the [ombudsman's] office would be just one more
nonconfidential opportunity for employees to air disputes. The
ombudsman's office provides an opportunity for complete disclosure,
without the specter of retaliation, that does not exist in the other available,
nonconfidential grievance and complaint procedures. "24
IV. CARMAN-FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In October 1992, McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corporation laid off
Frank Carman as part of a reduction in force of its management staff.25
Carman then sued McDonnell Douglas, claiming that his termination
violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Missouri Human
Rights Act and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.26
During discovery, Carman requested the production of fifty-four sets of
documents from McDonnell Douglas. 27 Among the requested documents
were all notes and documents reflecting data known to the company
ombudsman28 concerning Carman and other individuals, including meeting
notes regarding layoffs in Carman's division as well as meeting notes
22 See Kientzy, 133 F.R.D. at 571. The Kientzy court also emphasized the
importance of the nature of the defendant corporation's business-governmental
contracting in the aerospace and defense industries-in weighing the societal interest in
the relationship between the parties. See id. at 572. This was not a factor addressed by
the court in Carman, and accordingly will not be discussed here.
23 See id.
24 Id.
25 See Carman, 114 F.3d at 791.
26 See id.
27 See id.
28 The company ombudsman was an employee outside of the corporate chain of
command whose job it was to investigate and mediate workplace disputes. The
ombudsman was paid by the corporation but purported to be an independent and neutral
party who promised strict confidentiality to all employees. In addition, the ombudsman
was bound by the Code of Ethics of the Corporate Ombudsman Association, which
requires an ombudsman to keep communications confidential. See id. at 792-793 n. 1.
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involving Carman himself. 29 McDonnell Douglas objected to this and other
requests as vague, overbroad and irrelevant, and further objected to
production of the documents possessed by the ombudsman "because her
activities as an 'ombudsman' were considered confidential and any
information and documents relating to her activities are immune from
discovery." 30
The district court denied the discovery request pertaining to the
documents held by the ombudsman, holding that the documents were
protected by the "Ombudsman Privilege." 31 The court also held that
McDonnell Douglas was not required to produce adverse impact analyses
prepared in anticipation of litigation about the company's past reductions in
force to the McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Company, the component
company of McDonnell Douglas where Carman worked.32
In February 1996, the court granted summary judgment in favor of
McDonnell Douglas. 33 The court assumed that Carman had established a
prima facie case of age discrimination, but it held that Carman had failed to
present evidence sufficient to prove that McDonnell Douglas's proffered
reasons for laying him off were pretextual. 34 Carman appealed this decision
to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. 35
Carman alleged several errors on appeal. He contended that the district
court erred in granting summary judgment before McDonnell Douglas
complied with two document requests with respect to which the district
court had granted a motion to compel. 36 The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the lower court's decision with respect to these requests
was not erroneous, but noted that Carman should be given the opportunity
on remand to explain why he needed certain information. 37 The court also
held that the district court did not err in limiting Carman's request for
information about past reductions in force to the division in which he
worked. 38 The court stated that company-wide statistics are not usually
helpful in establishing pretext in employment discrimination cases because
29 See id. at 791.
30 Id. (citing Appellant's App. at 358).
31 See 04. at 792.
32 See id.
33 See id.
34 See id.
35 See id. at 790.
36 See id.
37 See id.
38 See id.
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those who make employment decisions vary across divisions. 39 The court's
decision to reverse and remand centered on its holding that no privilege
exists for corporate ombudsmen.40
t
V. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT'S DISCUSSION OF THE CORPORATE
OMBUDSMAN PRIVILEGE 41
In its discussion on the creation of evidentiary privileges, the court
analyzed the text of Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which states that federal
courts should recognize evidentiary privileges according to "the principles
of common law" interpreted "in the light of reason and experience. "42 The
court stated that "the beginning of any analysis under Rule 501 is the
39 See id.
40 See id. at 794-795.
41 As the first step in its discussion of the creation of a new evidentiary privilege,
the court decided to apply a de novo standard of review. Although neither party
addressed the issue, McDonnell Douglas apparently seemed to argue that the privilege
was reviewable only for an abuse of discretion. The court held, to the contrary, that the
scope of a privilege and the decision whether to establish a new privilege involved
mixed questions of law and fact that should be reviewed de novo. See id. at 793 n.2.
42 Id. at 793. The rule states as follows:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided
by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to
statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law
as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason
and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an
element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
FED. R. EviD. 501. Privileges that have historically been recognized at common
law include the attorney-client privilege and spousal privileges. See Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980); Edmund M. Morgan, FORwARD TO THE AMERICAN LAW
INsTrruTE's MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, 24-28 (1942). In addition, nearly two-thirds of
the states have enacted statutory provisions recognizing the physician-patient and
psychotherapist-patient privileges. See United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F.
Supp. 1038, 1040 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
280
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principle that 'the public has a right to every man's evidence."' 43 The court
then discussed the burden on the party seeking to establish a new
evidentiary privilege: "A party that seeks the creation of a new evidentiary
privilege must overcome the significant burden of establishing that
'permission of a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a
public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all
rational means for ascertaining truth.'"44
Working within this framework, the court balanced the interests at
stake in creating a new privilege. According to the court, the first factor to
consider with regard to a new evidentiary privilege is the importance of the
relationship that the privilege will foster. 45 McDonnell Douglas argued that
ombudsmen help resolve workplace disputes, heading off costly and time-
consuming litigation. Although the court recognized that fair and efficient
alternative dispute resolution techniques are worthy of encouragement
because they benefit society, it determined that more is required to justify
the creation of a new evidentiary privilege. 46
In the court's view, McDonnell Douglas failed to present evidence on
two important issues that would weigh in favor of recognizing a privilege
for corporate ombudsmen.47 First, the company failed to present evidence
-or even to argue-that the ombudsman method is more successful in
resolving workplace disputes than other alternative dispute resolution
methods. 48 The company also failed to present evidence to establish that its
own ombudsman program was especially successful in resolving workplace
disputes prior to the commencement of litigation.49 Second, McDonnell
Douglas failed to convince the court that most of the advantages afforded
by the ombudsman method would be lost in the absence of a privilege. 50
43 Carman, 114 F.3d at 793 (citing Hardwicke, L.C.J., quoted in 12 CoBBmr's
PARrnhNvTr¥y HmsTORy 675, 693 (1742), quoted with approval in United States v.
Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).
44 Carman, 114 F.3d at 793 (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50).
45 See Carman, 114 F.3d at 793.
46 See id.
47 See id.
48 See id.
49 See id. Here, the court distinguished Kientzy, supra note 18, at 572, where the
district court found that the office had received approximately 4800 communications
since 1985. McDonnell Douglas presented no such evidence in the instant case. See
Carman, 114 F.3d at 793.
50 See id.
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The court noted that even without a privilege, corporate ombudsmen
have much to offer in the way of confidentiality, because they could make
and keep a promise to keep employee communications confidential from
management. 51 The court concluded that the denial of the privilege would
not affect an ombudsman's ability to convince an employee that she is
neutral, and the creation of an ombudsman privilege for civil litigation
would not alleviate the employee's fear that the communications will be
reported to management. 52
The court also concluded that the denial of the privilege would not
deter employees from bringing their complaints to corporate ombudsmen. 53
McDonnell Douglas argued that "no present or future [McDonnell
Douglas] employee could feel comfortable in airing his or her disputes with
the Ombudsman because of the specter of discovery." 54 This argument
failed to persuade the court. The court stated that an employee with a
meritorious complaint that he would prefer not to litigate would generally
feel that he had nothing to hide and would be undeterred by the prospect of
civil discovery from sharing his complaint with the ombudsman. 55 The
court concluded that the "dim prospect" that the employee's complaint
might again someday surface in an unrelated case was an "unlikely
deterrent. "56
In addition, McDonnell Douglas argued that failure to recognize the
privilege would disrupt the relationship between management and the
ombudsman's office. 57 The court was also unpersuaded by this argument.
The court reasoned that a disruption in the management-ombudsman
relationship would be unlikely in cases in which management had nothing
to hide, and the court acknowledged that management would probably be
less likely to share damaging information with an ombudsman in the
51 See id. at 793-794. The court stated its belief that an aggrieved employee's
greatest concern, in deciding whether to confide in a company ombudsman, is not likely
to be that the statement will someday be disclosed in civil discovery. Instead, most
employees would fear that the ombudsman would be biased in favor of the company,
and that the ombudsman would report the employee's statements back to management.
See id. at 794.
52 See id.
53 See id.
54 Id. (citing Appellee's Br. at 45).
55 See id.
56 See id.
57 See id.
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absence of a privilege. 58 However, McDonnell Douglas did not present
evidence to this effect.59 Accordingly, the court concluded that there is no
reason to recognize an ombudsman privilege if the chilling of management-
ombudsman communications would occur only in cases that would not have
been resolved at the ombudsman stage anyway. 60
Finally, the court distinguished Kientzy. 61 In Kientzy, the court based
its decision on its view that confidentiality is essential to the function of the
ombudsman's office because without that confidentiality, the ombudsman's
office would be "just one more nonconfidential opportunity for employees
to air disputes." 62 This reasoning did not persuade the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals, which concluded that the corporate ombudsman would still be
able to promise confidentiality in most circumstances, even without the
privilege. 63
Finally, the court stated the balancing test to be applied in determining
whether to create a new privilege:
To justify the creation of a privilege, McDonnell Douglas must first
establish that society benefits in some significant way from the particular
brand of privilege that confidentiality affords. Only then can a court
decide whether the advantages of the proposed privilege overcome the
strong presumption in favor of disclosure of all relevant information. 64
The court then stated that "[t]he creation of a new evidentiary privilege
is a big step" that it was not convinced to take based upon the record. 65
VI. ANALYSIS
Prior to Carman, the only federal courts to have addressed the issue of
the corporate ombudsman privilege were willing to recognize such a
58 See id.
59 The court noted that McDonnell Douglas did not provide any reason to believe
that management was eager to confess wrongdoing to ombudsmen when a privilege
exists, or that ombudsmen are helpful at resolving disputes that involve violations of the
law by management or supervisors. See id.
60 See id.
61 133 F.R.D. 570 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
62 1d. at 572.
63 See Carman, 114 F.3d at 794.
64 Id.
65 Id.
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privilege based upon the specific facts of the particular cases. 66 Neither
court extended the protection to create a blanket privilege for
communications made to corporate ombudsmen. 67 These courts did,
however, establish a clear framework for the analysis of ombudsman
privilege cases. 68 The four-factor test established in Roy69 and applied in
Kientzy provides courts with a framework in which to balance the
conflicting interests between the strong public policy in the admissibility of
relevant evidence7° and the need for confidentiality in ombudsman-
employee relationships. 71
Viewed in this light, Carman may be seen as a case in which the
defendant simply failed to produce enough evidence to swing the balance in
favor of protecting the confidentiality of the communications. Although the
Carman court paid only cursory attention to these prior cases and did not
discuss the four factors set out in Roy and applied in Kientzy, the balancing
test the Carman court created emphasizes the same issues. The court's main
concern was the importance of the relationship that the privilege would
foster. The Roy and Kientzy courts were convinced that the privilege was
essential to maintaining the employee-ombudsman relationship. The Kientzy
court recognized the importance of the ombudsman's office in resolving
corporate disputes, and it concluded that the confidentiality afforded by the
privilege was necessary to serve that purpose. 72
However, McDonnell Douglas did not convince the Carman court that
the ombudsman's office was necessary to resolving corporate disputes. The
company failed to convince the court that the ombudsman method was
more successful in resolving workplace disputes than other alternative
dispute resolution methods, or that its own ombudsman program was
especially successful in resolving workplace disputes prior to the
66 See Roy, Civil Cause No. H89-680 (JAC) (D. Conn. 1990); Kientzy, 133
F.R.D. at 570.
67 See Roy, Civil Cause No. H89-680 (JAC) (D. Conn. 1990); Kientzy, 133
F.R.D. at 570,
68 See Thompson, supra note 1, at 677. See also Garstang v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles, 46 Cal. Rptr. 84, 88 at n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). (finding the Kientzy
reasoning useful in considering whether, and under what circumstances, a qualified
privilege should be extended to communications made before an ombudsman employed
by a private educational institution).
69 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
70 See Hardwicke, supra note 43.
71 See Thompson, supra note 1, at 654.
72 See Kientzy, 133 F.R.D. at 572.
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commencement of litigation. 73 In addition, the court was not convinced that
the creation of an evidentiary privilege was necessary to foster the
employee-ombudsman relationship. The court emphasized in its opinion
that the corporate ombudsman would still be able to guarantee
confidentiality in many circumstances, even without the privilege. 74 In
balancing the competing interests at stake, the court found that in this
instance, the creation of a new evidentiary privilege was not justified.75
In all three cases, the courts applied a balancing test weighing similar
issues. On that basis, the three cases can be reconciled. However, what the
cases also show is that applying a balancing test to determine whether a
privilege exists for corporate ombudsmen will yield different results based
upon the evidence presented and the particular views of the court hearing
the case. This introduces uncertainty into the relatively new and rapidly
developing practice of using ombudsmen to resolve corporate disputes. 76 It
has been argued that because ombudsmen serve varying roles in different
corporations and resolve different types of disputes, a case-by-case analysis
should be performed each time the issue of privilege is raised. 77 However,
it has also been argued that the effectiveness of corporate ombuds programs
rests on an employee's belief that information divulged will remain
confidential, and destroying the employee's confidence in that
confidentiality will destroy the corporate ombudsman program itself.78
VII. CONCLUSION
In light of the Carman decision and those preceding it, each court
considering the ombudsman privilege will be forced to apply a balancing
test and weigh the interest in disclosing relevant information against the
interest in fostering the employee-ombudsman relationship in resolving
corporate disputes. Without a clear legal standard on the existence of the
73 See Carmn, 114 F.3d at 793.
74 See id. at 794.
75 See id.
76 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 1, at 655-656.
77 See id. at 677-678 (arguing that although the ombudsman-employee relationship
is worthy of public interest and should be protected, a blanket privilege should not be
created but each corporate ombudsman program should be reviewed on a case-by-case
basis to ensure that it meets the requirements of public interest, neutrality and
confidentiality).
78 See Wibbenmeyer, supra note 3, at 379.
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privilege, corporations will be forced to weigh the risk of disclosure of
sensitive information during discovery against the benefit of internal
resolution of corporate disputes. Employees will be forced to weigh the
benefit of an efficient and economical means of resolving employment
disputes against the possible disclosure of personal information to
management in preparation for or during litigation.
Any corporation that hopes to invoke the ombudsman privilege will
have to convince the court first that the ombudsman program is essential to
resolving in-house disputes, and that this relationship is one that benefits
society as a whole. In addition, any party hoping to invoke the privilege
will need to prove that confidentiality is an essential component of this
relationship. Finally, a court must be convinced that the benefits of
confidentiality outweigh the strong policy interest in disclosure of relevant
information. Only time will tell what effect this decision has on other
federal courts that will be faced with the issue, as well as what impact the
Carman decision will have on the future of corporate ombuds programs. As
the programs continue to develop, so undoubtedly will this area of the law,
as the privilege is recognized or denied on a case-by-case basis.
Coie Mary
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